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Yes, but the avenue is restricted. The Supreme Court in Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India (2004) 4 SCC 311 upheld the constitutional validity of SARFAESI, except Section 17(2) — the pre-deposit condition for the borrower's appeal to the DRT — which it declared ultra vires Article 14. The restraint on writ petitions comes from a later decision, United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110: the High Court will ordinarily not entertain an Article 226 petition where an effective remedy, such as the Section 17 application to the DRT, is available. Constitutional challenges to SARFAESI itself (as opposed to a specific enforcement action) can still be filed, but are unlikely to succeed given the Mardia Chemicals ruling.
Article 300-A guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority of law. For debt recovery, this means that all enforcement actions — SARFAESI possession, DRT attachment, IBC liquidation asset sales — must strictly follow the procedural requirements of the respective statute. Any deviation from the prescribed procedure renders the enforcement action liable to challenge. Secured creditors must therefore ensure strict compliance with every step of SARFAESI (S.13(2) notice, 60-day period, S.13(4) possession notice, S.14 CMM/DM application) to defend against Article 300-A challenges.
The Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) held that a High Court will ordinarily not entertain a writ petition under Article 226 where an effective remedy — the DRT Section 17 application, open to the borrower, a guarantor or any other person affected by action under Section 13(4) or Section 14 — is available, and that in bank-recovery matters the High Court must insist that the statutory remedies are exhausted. The High Court's jurisdiction is not ousted; the rule is one of discretion. The Court did not list its own exceptions: it held that if the petitioner shows that the case falls within an exception recognised in its earlier judgments, the High Court may, after considering all relevant parameters and the public interest, pass an appropriate interim order, while remaining "extremely careful and circumspect" in granting a stay.
Article 20(3) provides that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against themselves. In banking fraud investigations, this means: (i) an accused borrower or director cannot be compelled by police to provide a statement that incriminates them — though they can be examined under BNSS S.180, they can refuse incriminating answers; (ii) they cannot be compelled to produce documents from their own possession that will incriminate them — though third parties (banks, auditors) can be compelled under BNSS S.94; (iii) a confession given under threat or duress is inadmissible. However, an eleven-judge bench in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) held that giving thumb, finger, palm or foot impressions, specimen writings, or showing parts of the body for identification is not 'being a witness' and does not violate Art.20(3). It also held that the protection applies only if the person stood in the character of an accused when the statement was made.
Entry 45 of the Union List (List I) gives Parliament exclusive power to legislate on banking. This constitutional foundation means: (i) SARFAESI Act, 2002 is a central law that applies uniformly across India — state governments cannot dilute or override it; (ii) When state laws conflict with SARFAESI, the central law prevails under Article 246(1); (iii) State-level Chief Ministers' Farm Loan Waiver Schemes cannot override outstanding dues to banks — they can only write off state government's share and do not affect the bank's legal right to recover; (iv) State government moratorium orders protecting certain borrowers from enforcement do not override the secured creditor's SARFAESI rights.
Special Leave Petition under Article 136 is the final appeal route from any court or tribunal in India to the Supreme Court. In the DRT appeals hierarchy — DRT Original Application → DRAT Appeal → High Court (Art.226/227) → Supreme Court (Art.136 SLP) — the SLP represents the terminal stage. Not every binding precedent on debt recovery came through Article 136: the constitutional validity of SARFAESI (Mardia Chemicals) was decided on transferred cases and writ petitions, and the treatment of homebuyers under the IBC (Pioneer Urban Land) and of financial and operational creditors (Swiss Ribbons) on Article 32 writ petitions. An SLP must be filed within 90 days of the HC judgment (extendable for cause). The filing of an SLP does not automatically stay the enforcement — a specific stay order from the Supreme Court is required.
Article 300-A guarantees that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority of law. For banks enforcing SARFAESI, this means every step of the enforcement process must strictly follow the statute. Any procedural deviation — failure to give proper Section 13(2) notice, not waiting 60 days, not following Section 14 CMM/DM application procedure — renders the enforcement action unconstitutional under Art.300-A, not merely procedurally irregular. This is why strict compliance with each statutory step matters. Secured creditors must follow the exact prescribed procedure: (1) NPA classification and demand notice under Section 13(2); (2) 60-day response period; (3) Section 13(4) possession notice; (4) Section 14 CMM/DM application with affidavit; (5) physical possession; (6) valuation and sale notice. Any shortcut or deviation at any stage creates a constitutional vulnerability under Art.300-A.
Whether you are a secured creditor defending a writ petition or a borrower challenging enforcement, Our team provides constitutional law counsel for debt recovery matters.